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We describe the service-for-prestige theory of leadership, which proposes that voluntary
leader–follower relations evolved in humans via a process of reciprocal exchange that
generated adaptive benefits for both leaders and followers. We propose that although
leader–follower relations first emerged in the human lineage to solve problems related
to information sharing and social coordination, they ultimately evolved into exchange
relationships whereby followers could compensate leaders for services which would
otherwise have been prohibitively costly for leaders to provide. In this exchange, leaders
incur costs to provide followers with public goods, and in return, followers incur costs to
provide leaders with prestige (and associated fitness benefits). Because whole groups of
followers tend to gain from leader-provided public goods, and because prestige is costly for
followers to produce, the provisioning of prestige to leaders requires solutions to the “free
rider” problem of disrespectful followers (who benefit from leader serviceswithout sharing
the costs of producing prestige).Thus service-for-prestige makes the unique prediction that
disrespectful followers of beneficial leaders will be targeted by other followers for punitive
sentiment and/or social exclusion. Leader–follower relations should be more reciprocal
and mutually beneficial when leaders and followers have more equal social bargaining
power. However, as leaders gain more relative power, and their high status becomes
less dependent on their willingness to pay the costs of benefitting followers, service-for-
prestige predicts that leader–follower relations will become based more on leaders’ ability
to dominate and exploit rather than benefit followers.We review evidential support for a set
of predictions made by service-for-prestige, and discuss how service-for-prestige relates
to social neuroscience research on leadership.
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INTRODUCTION
Leadership and followership have evolved to facilitate information
sharing and coordinated group action in a wide variety of species
(King et al., 2009). Humans are apparently adapted for complex
cooperative behaviors that require high levels of expertise, coor-
dination, and solutions to collective action problems (Tooby et al.,
2006), and it would not be surprising if they, like so many other
species, have also evolved psychological adaptations for leader-
ship and followership (Van Vugt and Ahuja, 2010; Van Vugt and
Ronay, 2014). In this article, we propose that such adaptations
have indeed evolved, and that they govern the dynamics of leader–
follower relations in humanorganizations. Our focus is specifically
on leader–follower relations in humans, as opposed to any other
species.We describe a theory of leader–follower relationswhichwe
think will ultimately enhance social neuroscientists’ understand-
ing of the neural processes that enable these relations. Scientists are
still in the early stages of understanding how the mind is adapted
to lead and follow, and of developing neuroscientific methods for
identifying psychological adaptations (Van Vugt, 2014). Never-
theless, the key conceptual elements of a coherent and plausible
evolutionary theory of leader–follower relations are already in
place (Price and Van Vugt, in press), and neuroscientists have
already begun using evolutionary theories of psychological adap-
tation to guide their research on social interactions (Rilling and
Sanfey, 2011). Thus, we propose that evolutionary social psychol-
ogists and social neuroscientists should begin engaging with each
other more on the topic of leader–follower relations, and thinking
about ways in which evolutionary approaches to these relations
could both inform and be informed by neuroscientific research.
From the perspective of evolutionary psychology (Tooby and
Cosmides, 1992, 2005), voluntary social relationships are likely to
evolve if they provide all partners in the relationship with indi-
vidual fitness benefits – that is, with benefits that enhance the
survival and reproduction of the individual (and/or the indi-
vidual’s very close genetic kin). We take this perspective on
leader–follower relations, so a key question driving our analysis
is: how might leader–follower relationships have been mutually
fitness-enhancing for both leaders and followers in the environ-
ments of the evolutionary past? We pay close attention to past
evolutionary environments, because any evolved psychological
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mechanisms that exist today in the minds of modern humans,
including those governing leader–follower relationships, could
exist only if they functioned adaptively in these environments
(Tooby and Cosmides, 1990).
We propose that voluntary leader–follower relationships –
that is, interactions in which followers voluntarily follow, and
leaders voluntarily lead, because they each perceive some pos-
itive incentive to do so – were adaptive in the past for both
leaders and followers because they involved mutually beneficial
exchange. In this exchange, leaders enhanced the fitness of fol-
lowers by providing them with collectively shared benefits and
resources (often in the form of “public goods”) that enhanced
followers’ wealth, status, and ability to function in coordinated
and cooperative groups, and followers enhanced the fitness of
leaders by providing them with prestige. As we will discuss in
more detail below, by “prestige” we mean social status that is
voluntarily conferred on those who are useful to others, as dis-
tinguished from “dominance,” which is status that is attained
coercively by those who are threatening to others (Henrich and
Gil-White, 2001). Evidence suggests that prestige and dominance
are two distinguishably different paths that individuals can take
in order to increase their social status (Von Rueden et al., 2011;
Cheng et al., 2012).
The more equal the social bargaining power of leaders and
followers (i.e., the more equal their abilities to confer bene-
fits and/or impose costs on one another; Sell et al., 2009), the
more likely the leader–follower relationship would have remained
voluntary, mutually fitness-enhancing, and maximally beneficial
overall. However, the greater the bargaining power of leaders rel-
ative to followers, the more likely the relationship would have
been to transition from being reciprocal and prestige-based to
being coercive, exploitative, and dominance-based. This tran-
sition should occur because from the leader’s perspective, the
leader–follower relationship is advantageous primarily as a means
of acquiring and maintaining high social status. When followers
have relatively high relative bargaining power (e.g., high freedom
to exit the group, high power to reject or retaliate against lead-
ers), the easiest way for leaders to achieve high status will be to
make themselves useful to followers by offering them benefits in
exchange for prestige. In these situations, if leaders attempt to
claim high status without offering followers anything in return, or
by attempting to dominate and coerce followers, then their would-
be followers can simply reject them (e.g., exit the group or depose
the leader). However, when followers have relatively low bargain-
ing power, leaders will have increased ability to gain and maintain
status based on their ability to dominate, rather than benefit, fol-
lowers. For example, if followers have low power to exit a group or
to strip a leader of his or her high status, then the leader will have
little need to offer them benefits, in order to compel them to (a)
stay in the group or (b) grant the leader high status in exchange
for these benefits. Leaders may sometimes perceive dominance, as
compared to reciprocity, to be an appealingly cheap and efficient
route to high status, as it saves them the costs of having to produce
benefits for followers.
We refer to the above theory of how and why leader–follower
relationships vary from reciprocity to dominance as service-for-
prestige (Price and Van Vugt, in press).
HOW ARE LEADER–FOLLOWER RELATIONS DIFFERENT IN HUMANS
THAN IN OTHER SPECIES?
As noted above, leader–follower relations have evolved in a wide
variety of species to allow individuals to share information and
coordinate their behavior (King et al., 2009). For instance in many
taxa, individuals share knowledge in order to lead followers to the
locations of food, water, and other resources (examples include
ravens, elephants, and most famously honeybees, who map out
directions to resources via waggle dances); in many fish species,
leader–follower dynamics result in groups (shoals and schools)
that are helpful for avoiding predators and finding food; and
among some primates such as chimpanzees, alpha males lead
aggressive group actions against enemy groups and predators
(Boehm, 1999; Krause and Ruxton, 2002; King et al., 2009). In
the human lineage, just as in other species, leadership probably
evolved initially to solve problems related to information sharing
and social coordination. However,we propose that eventually, evo-
lution enabled humans to use reciprocity to enhance the benefits
of leadership.
To understand why reciprocity could enhance leadership, con-
sider that leader–follower dynamics often evolve in situations
where individuals are better off acting in groups as opposed to
acting alone, for example, because group membership increases
one’s likelihoodof finding resources or escaping predators (Hamil-
ton, 1971; Van Vugt and Kurzban, 2007). Such group movements
present coordination problems, however, associated with deter-
mining who will lead and who will follow. For example, if
Individuals A and B both have an interest in visiting a waterhole
together (because there is safety in numbers), and have several
waterholes to choose from, how will they choose which one to
visit? There are several ways in which leader–follower dynamics
could emerge to solve this problem (VanVugt and Kurzban, 2007).
For example, imagine that A prefers a particular waterhole but
B has no preference, and as a result A moves first to choose the
preferred waterhole. Once A has made this move, B is best off
following A, as opposed to making a dangerous solo journey to
a waterhole that offers B no additional benefits. Leadership may
have evolved in many species to solve coordination problems such
as these, when there has been a fitness advantage to the individual
in assuming a leadership role (Van Vugt, 2006).
However, what about situations in which the individual is dis-
advantaged by assuming a leadership role? Many leadership roles
may involve substantial costs to leaders, and individuals may need
special incentives to accept these roles. If followers stand to benefit
from a leader’s assumption of a costly role (e.g., if this leadership
would provide protection for followers), then it might profit fol-
lowers to provide the leader with these incentives. This potential
for reciprocity could provide new opportunities for leadership to
evolve, such that leader–follower relations could become not just
matters of coordination but also matters of exchange. We pro-
pose that leader–follower relations evolved as service-for-prestige
transactions in contexts such as these, to enable leadership behav-
iors that would otherwise have been prohibitively costly. However,
engagement in reciprocity, particularly in the complexly coop-
erative social environments of human beings, requires specially
designed social-cognitive abilities that are uniquely sophisticated
in humans (Tooby and Cosmides, 1996; Hammerstein, 2002;
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Tooby et al., 2006; Bowles andGintis, 2011). Therefore,we propose
that service-for-prestige exchange is a crucial aspect of leader–
follower dynamics in humans, but not necessarily in any other
species.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SERVICE-FOR-PRESTIGE:
SYNTHESIZING THEORIES OF RECIPROCITY AND
COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND ACCOUNTING FOR
EVOLUTIONARY MISMATCH
EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES OF RECIPROCITY
Human leader–follower relationships are cooperative interactions
that occur between people who are not necessarily close genetic
kin. One of our key theoretical tools, therefore, will be the main
concept used by evolutionists to explain non-kin cooperation:
reciprocity (Trivers, 1971; Alexander, 1979; Tooby et al., 2006).
Reciprocity theories assume that because cooperative individuals
incur fitness costs in order to deliver fitness benefits to others, they
must receive some return benefit from others as compensation for
these costs. In the absence of such compensation, cooperation will
be maladaptive for cooperators and will not evolve.
The most basic form of reciprocal cooperation is direct reci-
procity, described originally by Trivers (1971) as “reciprocal
altruism.” Trivers (1971) described mutually beneficial exchange
between a cooperator (or “altruist”) and a reciprocating partner.
For example, if X pays a cost of size 1 to provide Y with a ben-
efit of size 2, and Y precisely returns the favor, then X and Y
will each have paid a cost of 1 and received a benefit 2, and the
exchange will be mutually profitable. However, it is crucial to
note that Y could have profited even more by “cheating,” that is,
by taking X’s 2 without reciprocating 1. In order for reciprocity
to evolve in direct exchange contexts, cooperators must some-
how avoid being exploited by cheaters, for example, by avoiding
them altogether, or by neutralizing their advantage via punish-
ment. If cheaters consistently tend to come out ahead in these
interactions, they will eventually exploit cooperators to extinction
and cooperation will not evolve (Hamilton, 1964; Trivers, 1971;
Henrich, 2004; Price and Johnson, 2011). Individuals should thus
be predisposed to cooperate with reciprocators, and be averse
to cooperating with cheaters. This prediction is supported by
a large body of evidence from several behavioral science fields
(Price, 2006a). Reciprocity has long been considered a fundamen-
tal attribute of human social systems cross-culturally (Gouldner,
1960), and it is generally considered to be a universal, species-
typical, and highly fitness-relevant human behavior (Brown, 1991;
Rilling and Sanfey, 2011).
The reciprocity theory presented by Trivers (1971) primar-
ily describes reciprocity that is direct and dyadic (i.e., involving
direct exchange between two individuals). However, extensions of
this theory have been used to explain other forms of reciprocity.
The best known example is “indirect reciprocity,” that is, interac-
tions in which X’s altruism toward Y is reciprocated not by Y but
by a third party (Alexander, 1979; Nowak and Sigmund, 2005).
There have also been attempts to apply reciprocity theory to direct
exchanges between one individual and a group of other individuals
(Boyd and Richerson, 1988; Price, 2003, 2006a; Tooby et al., 2006;
Takezawa andPrice, 2010). Because leader–follower relations often
(although not exclusively) involve interaction between one leader
and multiple followers, this kind of reciprocity would seem most
relevant to an understanding of leader–follower exchange. How-
ever, it is not widely accepted among evolutionary researchers
that direct reciprocity can explain the evolution of cooperation in
group contexts such as these (Boyd and Richerson, 1988; Henrich,
2004; Bowles and Gintis, 2011). In the view of these researchers,
direct reciprocity can explain the evolution of simple dyadic coop-
eration, but totally different processes such as cultural group
selection are required to explain cooperation in groups. Our appli-
cation of reciprocity to these contexts, then, does not represent
the consensus view of evolutionary researchers, and important
theoretical questions still need to be resolved about precisely how
leader–follower exchange could evolve.
Nevertheless, despite this lack of a theoretical consensus,
we agree with previous suggestions (Price, 2003, 2006a; Tooby
et al., 2006) that direct reciprocity (in combination with indi-
rect reciprocity) may be a key factor in the evolution of group
cooperation in humans, and we do not think that it is pre-
mature or implausible to suggest that leaders and followers
often engage in mutually beneficial exchange. We propose that
reciprocity theory provides the most appropriate and predic-
tive evolutionary framework for understanding voluntary human
leader–follower interactions, because (1) leaders often incur costs
in their efforts to provide benefits for followers, (2) followers
often incur costs in order to provide prestige which benefits lead-
ers, (3) in order for each of these costly provisioning behaviors
to be adaptive in the ancestral past, both leaders and follow-
ers would have needed to recoup these costs somehow, and
(4) this recoupment could plausibly have occurred via a process
in which leader-produced benefits were exchanged for follower-
produced prestige. Illustrations of why it is often costly for
leaders to provide public goods and for followers to provide pres-
tige, and of why prestige entails fitness benefits, are presented
below.
LEADER–FOLLOWER RECIPROCITY AS A COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM
Our second key theoretical tool is Olson’s (1965) theory of col-
lective action, which states that even if group members benefit on
average if their group cooperates effectively, individual members
can often reap the greatest private profits if they “free ride” while
the rest of the group pays the costs of cooperation. This free rider
problem– the private incentive that each individualmember has to
free ride on everyone else’s contributions – often seriously under-
mines group efforts to cooperate, and is considered by behavioral
scientists to be the fundamental obstacle to successful collective
action (Yamagishi, 1986; Boyd and Richerson, 1988, 1992; Ostrom,
1990).
Service-for-prestige regards leader–follower reciprocity as a col-
lective action problem because many benefits provided by a leader
(e.g., increased group status, improved group defense, and access
to resources) will be public goods, shared widely and more or less
equally by followers. A leader’s motivation to provide such ben-
efits will thus also constitute a (second-order) public good. The
public goods provided by the leader will often be costly to produce,
and if increased prestige is what motivates the leader to pay these
production costs (as service-for-prestige predicts), then followers
must succeed in providing the leader with prestige, in order to
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maintain production of these public goods. If the prestige allo-
cated to leaders is costly for individual followers to provide, then
its allocation will present a collective action problem for followers
(Price, 2003; Price and Van Vugt, in press).
To understand why prestige allocation should constitute a col-
lective action problem for followers, it helps to first consider social
power more abstractly. Emerson (1962) provides a simple and
useful definition of social power when he notes the reciprocal rela-
tionship between power and dependence: Individual X has power
over Individual Y to the extent that Y must depend exclusively on
X for the achievement of some goal, that is, to the extent that Y’s
ability to achieve the goal is controlled by X. Similarly, because Y’s
goals will generally involve the acquisition of benefits and avoid-
ance of harm, the power of X (i.e., the dependence of Y on X,
and X’s control over Y’s goal achievement) can also be thought
of as X’s ability to confer benefits and/or impose harm on Y (Sell
et al., 2009). If X has high power, this should improve X’s access
to many kinds of resources: if X is highly able to benefit and/or
harm others, then those whom X can benefit/harm will be moti-
vated to act in ways that promote X’s welfare, so that they can
remain in good standing with X and thus acquire these benefits
and/or avoid this harm. As a result, people will tend to go out of
their way to promote X’s welfare (Henrich and Gil-White, 2001;
Sell et al., 2009), for example, by deferring to X’s interests, shar-
ing resources with X, taking pains to avoid causing harm to X,
and cooperating with X. High social power (“status”) is therefore
expected to benefit X’s fitness by improving X’s access to many
kinds of resources (Von Rueden et al., 2011, in press; for more
on the nature of these resources, see below section on small-scale
societies).
The notion that social power is rooted in ones’ ability to benefit
and/or harm others corresponds well to Henrich and Gil-White’s
(2001) conceptualization of prestige and dominance as two differ-
ent kinds of social status (noted above), with prestige being status
that is voluntarily conferred on those who are perceived as offer-
ing benefits, and dominance being status that is attained coercively
by those who are perceived as threatening harm. (However, note
that these two paths to status will rarely be completely distinct,
since traits that lead to prestige can frequently lead to dominance,
and vice versa; Henrich and Gil-White, 2001; Von Rueden et al.,
2011). If prestige is conceptualized as something that is freely con-
ferred, then efforts made by the prestige allocator to promote the
prestigious individual’s welfare ought to be thought of – like any
kind of behavior in which one individual intentionally and vol-
untarily incurs costs to deliver benefits to another individual –
as a kind of biological “altruism” (Tooby and Cosmides, 1996).
We believe that conceptualizing prestige in this way, and distin-
guishing it from dominance, are useful means of understanding
the different ways in which leaders can acquire status. However,
unlike the service-for-prestige theory we present here, Henrich
and Gil-White (2001) regard prestige as something that is offered
in exchange not for public goods but for a private good: the priv-
ilege of affiliating socially with the prestigious individual. In their
view, individuals with high levels of expertise are allocated pres-
tige by those who wish to learn from and copy their behavior; by
allocating prestige to an expert (i.e., by acting in ways that benefit
the expert’s welfare), followers can ingratiate themselves to, and
thus enhance their own ability to copy, the expert. Although we
do agree that prestige allocation may often occur as a way to com-
pensate experts for providing private goods, we suggest that it also
often occurs as a way to compensate leaders for providing public
goods.
If prestige is indeed allocated in exchange for public goods, and
if prestige and its behavioral consequences are indeed costly to
produce, then it becomes easy to see why the allocation of pres-
tige to leaders will entail a collective action problem. In order
for followers to motivate leaders to provide public goods, they
must collectively pay the costs of respect. That is, they must as
a group incur costs to allocate prestige to the leader – and the
increased access to the group’s material, reproductive, and social
resources that this prestige will entail – to an extent that compen-
sates the leader for the cost of providing public goods. Because
this represents a collective action problem, a follower could gain a
free rider’s advantage by accepting the benefits of leadership while
refusing to pay these costs. For example, consider a leader who
routinely incurs costs (e.g., risks his own life in battle, assumes
stressful responsibilities, works long and hard on military strat-
egy) in order to guide his group to success in war. His services
enable his followers to acquire public goods such as better terri-
tory, shared resources, and increased group status. Imagine two
followers in this group, both of whom benefit equally from the
leader’s services. Follower 1 is respectful, and tends to engage
in costly acts that benefit the leader (e.g., does favors for and
shares resources with the leader; refrains from having an affair
with the leader’s wife; takes pains to look out for the welfare of
the leader’s children; strives to comply with the leader’s directives;
pays taxes or tribute to the leader; takes risks to ensure the safety
and health of the leader). Follower 2 free rides on the leader’s
services by doing none of these things, and thus enjoys higher
net benefits (benefits received from the leader’s services, minus
costs paid to be respectful) than Follower 1. Because each follower
in this scenario has a personal incentive to free ride, there is the
risk that the collective effort will fail to produce sufficient pres-
tige to compensate the leader for the costs of providing public
goods.
Just like cheaters in reciprocal exchanges, free riders in collective
actions will exploit cooperators to extinction unless their advan-
tages are neutralized (Yamagishi, 1986; Boyd andRicherson, 1992).
As a result, cooperators strive to neutralize free riders’ advantages
via punishment or social exclusion (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Price
and Johnson, 2011). The collective action scenario described here
is unusual in that it is a collective action for the purpose of engag-
ing in reciprocity. Collective actions are typically conceptualized as
functioning to produce or acquire some shared material resource
(for example, a group of citizens jointly generating tax revenue, or
a group of hunters jointly killing a large game animal), but in this
case, the joint effort is focused on producing sufficient prestige to
compensate the leader for services rendered. As a result, Follower
2 above is in the unusual position of simultaneously representing
both a cheater in a reciprocal interaction (for failing to engage in
a service-for-prestige transaction with the leader) and a free rider
in a collective action (for failing to cooperate with fellow followers
in collectively producing prestige for the leader). Follower 2 will
therefore be a prime target for hostility within the group: both
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the leader and the other followers have incentives to punish or
ostracize Follower 2.
Because service-for-prestige is unique (as far as we know) in
regarding the allocation of prestige to leaders as a collective action
problem, it is also unique in predicting that this problem will
need to be solved via the punishment and/or social exclusion of
disrespectful followers. We say more about this prediction and
related predictions below.
MISMATCH THEORY: ANCIENT ADAPTATIONS IN MODERN
ENVIRONMENTS
A final key component of service-for-prestige is mismatch theory.
Because psychological adaptations evolved in ancestral environ-
ments that may be quite different in certain respects than present
environments, we cannot always expect for adaptations to func-
tion adaptively in modern societies (Tooby and Cosmides, 1990).
A common example is human gustatory preferences for fats, sug-
ars, and salts. Because these nutrients were essential but difficult to
acquire in ancestral environments, people have apparently evolved
to be strongly motivated to consume them. These motivations
may function maladaptively in environments where these nutri-
ents are easily obtained, by leading to health problems associated
with over-consumption (Nesse andWilliams, 1994). Some aspects
of leader–follower relations may represent mismatches with mod-
ern environments (Van Vugt et al., 2008b); we provide several
examples below.
LEADER–FOLLOWER RELATIONS IN THE HUMAN
EVOLUTIONARY PAST
Before we focus on service-for-prestige in modern contexts, we
will examine how leadership and followership operated in small-
scale (i.e., hunter-gatherer and tribal) societies that most closely
approximate those in which our ancestors spent the vast fraction
of their evolutionary history.
The available evidence suggests that leadership and follow-
ership are universal aspects of human nature: these behaviors
appear at all levels of social organization that have existed since
prehistoric times, including hunter-gatherer and tribal societies
(Brown, 1991; Van Vugt et al., 2008a). Leadership is used in these
societies to facilitate cooperation in activities such as warfare, forg-
ing political alliances, maintaining within-group order, big game
hunting, and moving camp (Service, 1966; Johnson and Earle,
1987), all of which are vital to the success, status, and fitness
of individuals living in groups. Ethnographic accounts of lead-
ers in these domains generally describe the leaders as men, rather
than women (Service, 1966; Johnson and Earle, 1987). However,
although women only rarely hold the most directly influential
political positions in small-scale societies, they commonly lead in
more indirect ways by exerting substantial influence on political
affairs (Low,1992;Yanca andLow,2004; Bowser andPatton,2010).
A common observation about leadership in small-scale soci-
eties is that it tends to be informal and based on achievement
(Fried, 1967; Kelly, 1995). Compared to leaders in industrial-
ized societies, these leaders have little power to force others to do
what they say. This is especially true in nomadic hunter-gatherer
societies, which, compared to sedentary small-scale societies,
involve smaller group sizes and lower population densities. There
are usually no formal leadership offices or duties in nomadic
hunter-gatherer societies, and leaders tend to lead by persua-
sion and demonstrations of their expertise and ability to benefit
others (Service, 1966; Johnson and Earle, 1987). Nomadic hunter-
gatherers rarely recognize anyone as a formal headman and tend
to express low tolerance for domineering leaders (Service, 1966;
Turnbull, 1968; Lee, 1993).
Small-scale societies also tend to recognize different leaders
in different domains (cf. the concept of distributed leadership;
Gronn, 2002). Leadership requires expertise, and different peo-
ple may have expertise in different activities (Service, 1966). For
instance, the leader of a hunting expedition may not be the same
person who organizes an alliance with a friendly group or a raid
against an unfriendly one. The traditional authority system of the
Navajo, for example, included war leaders, peace leaders (who
organized friendly political interactions), hunt leaders, medical
leaders, and ceremonial song leaders (Shepardson, 1963).
By assisting the group in domains such as political relations
with external groups, maintenance of internal order, big game
hunting, and camp movements, leaders provided followers with
public goods. For instance, success in war can bring a wide vari-
ety of collective benefits, including increased access to territory,
mates, and other resources (Keeley, 1996), and success in hunting
large game produces meat that is widely shared among the entire
residential group (Kelly, 1995). Leaders often incur large costs
to generate these public goods. Big game hunting, for example,
can involve large investments of time and effort and significant
risks. A survey of “persistence hunts” among Kalahari hunter-
gatherers suggests that members of hunting parties chase large
game for 3–6 h across distances of 20–35 km (12–22 mi), in diffi-
cult conditions such as extreme heat and dense bush (Liebenberg,
2006). War leadership represents another example of costly public
goods provisioning; war leaders gain reputations for bravery by
taking risks (for example, fighting in the front lines) that enable
their groups to effectively compete for resources (Meggitt, 1977;
Chagnon, 1988).
Why are leaders willing to incur large costs in order to provide
followers with public goods? Plausibly because provisioning of
public goods is a key way in which members of small-scale groups
can acquire social status (Price, 2003, 2006a,b). Because leaders
in small-scale societies have little power to coerce and dominate
followers, their high status appears to be more similar to voluntar-
ily conferred prestige than to dominance (Henrich and Gil-White,
2001; Van Vugt and Ahuja, 2010). These leaders benefit from their
high status: prestigious individuals are highly valued by others as
friends and allies and therefore social and material resources tend
to flow their way. Leaders’ increased access to these resources may
sometimes be observable only over the long-term, as opposed to
the immediate short-term (Von Rueden et al., in press); for exam-
ple, among Ache forager-horticulturalists, those who consistently
produce and share large amounts of food appear to be rewarded
over the long-term by receiving more food from others when they
are sick or injured (Gurven et al., 2000). In a community of Tsi-
manehunter-horticulturalists, themost prestigious and influential
men did not receive more shared food over the short-term, but
were more likely to receive social support (e.g., help with labor),
food, and cash during times of crop failure (Von Rueden, 2011).
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Similarly, magnanimous leadership among the Martu Aborigines
in Australia is believed to be rewarded over the long-term with
social and political support (Bird and Bliege Bird, 2010).
A further important way in which status enhances male fit-
ness in these societies is by contributing to reproductive success.
Status is attractive both to women (Ellis, 1992; Li, 2007) and
to parents who wish to betroth their daughter to a high status
man as a way of creating a useful ally (Hart and Pilling, 1960;
Kelly, 1995). Ethnographic evidence suggests that in these soci-
eties, higher status men – or leaders – have more wives and sexual
partners, as well as higher-fertility wives and more surviving off-
spring (Levi-Strauss, 1967;Chagnon,1979,1988; Betzig,1986;Von
Rueden et al., 2008, 2011). For example, relatively high levels of
status and reproductive success are attained both by leaders in the
hunting domain who provide their group with large game as a
public good (Hawkes, 1993; Hawkes and Bliege Bird, 2002), and
by leaders in the war domain who contribute to their group’s abil-
ity to compete for resources (Matthiessen, 1962; Meggitt, 1977;
Chagnon, 1988).
The importance of leadership in small-scale societies tends to
correlate positively with the degree to which settlement patterns
are sedentary as opposed to nomadic, because sedentism permits
larger residential group sizes and higher population density (Fried,
1967; Johnson and Earle, 1987; Marlowe, 2011). When groups
are larger, coordination and collective action problems involved
in group action are harder to solve, and leadership is relatively
more important (Carneiro, 2000; Tooby et al., 2006; Hooper et al.,
2010). Within-group disputes between members (e.g., dyadic
conflicts) may also become more frequent in larger groups, neces-
sitating leadership to resolve them. Further, when population
density is lower and it’s easier to move camp, individuals can
more freely leave and switch groups. Nomadic hunter-gatherers
exhibit “fission–fusion” social organization, with unstable group
membership rosters. Groups may break apart or join together,
depending on the abundance of local resources and the quality of
social relationships within the group (Turnbull, 1968; Kelly, 1995).
This arrangement makes it relatively easy for group members to
escape a leader who becomes too dominant. But with increases
in sedentism and population density, fission–fusion social orga-
nization becomes less tenable, and followers become less capable
of exiting groups with dominant leaders (Boehm, 1999; Price and
Van Vugt, in press). Sedentism may also be associated with more
powerful leadership if it is enabled by the presence of a “patchy”
resource (i.e., one concentrated in a fixed location) that can be
monopolized and controlled by leaders, such as the salmon runs
of the Northwest Coast described below (Kelly, 1995).
The transition to agriculture is associated with increases
in group size, population density, and sedentism, as well as
increases in the power and dominance of leaders. Typical nomadic
hunter-gatherer bands consist of 25–50 members, but typical
hunter-horticulturalist villages consist of 100–400 residents (John-
son and Earle, 1987; Kelly, 1995). Leaders are more powerful in
hunter-horticultural compared to nomadic hunter-gatherer soci-
eties, with formally recognized “Big Men” exhibiting enduring
political authority, and with social organization becoming more
hierarchical (Meggitt, 1977; Johnson and Earle, 1987; Chagnon,
1997; Boehm, 1999). Greater sedentism and population density
also mean that hunter-horticultural settlements are more “socially
circumscribed” (i.e., hemmed in by neighboring settlements) than
the camps of nomadic hunter-gatherers (Chagnon, 1997), which
reduces the feasibility of fission–fusionorganization and the ability
of followers to escape overly dominant leaders.
However, it is not agriculture per se, but rather the increased
group size and population density that agriculture permits, that
seems to lead to increases in the power and dominance of lead-
ers. The Indians of the American Pacific Northwest Coast provide
a useful illustration of how leaders can become more powerful
and dominant with increases in group size and population den-
sity, even in the absence of agriculture (Price and Van Vugt, in
press). By residing near salmon-rich rivers, these hunter-gatherers
could maintain sedentary villages of 500–800 people and popula-
tion densities of one to two people per square mile, both unusually
high figures for either hunter-gatherers or hunter-horticulturalists
(Johnson and Earle, 1987). These villages required strong leaders
because it is challenging to organize large groups for collective
action and resource redistribution (Fried,1967; Johnson andEarle,
1987). Accordingly, Northwest Coast leaders were much more
powerful than typical hunter-gatherer leaders, and are regarded
by anthropologists as being the key to the functioning of the
Northwest Coast political economy (Johnson and Earle, 1987).
These leaders were clearly identified by followers as chiefs and as
essential group representatives in political interactions, and they
broadcast their wealth and status in lavish potlatch ceremonies in
which they distributed and sometimes destroyed large collections
of their material goods.
Not only were followers more dependent on leaders in the envi-
ronments of the Northwest Coast, they were also more helpless to
escape dominant leaders, due to the unfeasibility of fission–fusion
organization (that is, the sedentary lifestyle and high popula-
tion density made it more difficult for group members to hive
off from groups with bad leaders, in order to live and forage
in a different territory). Moreover, the patchy distribution of
salmon runs enabled chiefs to control access to the region’s most
important food resource, which further increased follower depen-
dence (Kelly, 1995). The decreased exit options and increased
dependence of followers seem to have increased the extent of
dominance-based leader–follower relationships: although slavery
is rare in hunter-gatherer societies, it was common throughout the
Northwest Coast, with slaves composing 7–15% of a typical com-
munity (Kelly, 1995). As noted above, this association between
reduced follower bargaining power and increased dominance in
leader–follower relations is a prediction of service-for-prestige,
which assumes that leaders tend to maintain their high status in
the least costly way that they can; if they can maintain it without
having to pay the costs of providing benefits for followers, they will
tend to do so. That is, when followers aremore powerless to escape,
reject, or retaliate against leaders, leaders will more likely attempt
to maintain their status via their ability to dominate and exploit
followers, as opposed to their ability to engage in reciprocity with
them.
The positive relationships between group size/population den-
sity and more powerful leadership can also be observed not just
by comparing different societies but by comparing different settle-
ment patterns within the same society. Carneiro (2000) describes
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how these patterns changed seasonally among North American
Plains Indians. For most of the year they lived in small bands of
about 50 people, but during the summer buffalo hunt 20 or more
of these bands would coalesce to form a much larger group. The
dramatic size increase was accompanied by an equally dramatic
elaboration of leadership structure. Whereas leadership in the sin-
gle band involved little power and few duties (i.e., it was fairly
typical of a small nomadic foraging society), leadership in the large
aggregation involved a tribal council of band leaders headed by a
designated tribal chief, as well as several men’s societies, including
one that acted as a police force to maintain order in the settlement.
Like the different small-scale societies discussed above, the
hunter-gatherer societies of the human evolutionary past have
probably varied considerably in terms of key demographic fac-
tors such as group size and population density (Kelly, 1995). We
suggest that this variation affected the balance of power between
leaders and followers and therefore influenced the prevalence of
reciprocal versus coercive leadership of these societies. We also
suggest that human mental adaptations for leadership and follow-
ership were designed by the selection pressures that existed across
this range of different environments, and so are calibrated to gen-
erate a range of behavioral outputs, depending on the balance
of power between leaders and followers that is perceived in the
environment.
SERVICE-FOR-PRESTIGE IN INDUSTRIALIZED SOCIETIES
The human mind was designed by and for the environments of
small-scale ancestral societies (Tooby and Cosmides, 1990, 1992,
2005). The above examination of leader–follower relations in such
societies therefore provides an essential foundation for our next
task,which is to evaluate the extent towhich predictions of service-
for-prestige are supported by observations of leader–follower
relations in industrialized societies.
PREDICTION 1: FOLLOWERS PREFER TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN LEADERS,
BY ALLOCATING PRESTIGE TO THOSE WHO PROVIDE THEM WITH
BENEFITS
Experimental evidence suggests that people in industrialized soci-
eties, just like in small-scale societies, prefer to follow leaders
who they have chosen themselves, rather than leaders who have
been imposed on them by an external agent (Van Vugt et al.,
2004). Further, their mechanism for choosing leaders is simi-
lar to that used in small-scale societies (Price, 2003, 2006a,b):
they reward group-beneficial contributions with prestige (Price
and Van Vugt, in press). Studies conducted among both univer-
sity students and business employees indicate that when group
members are allowed to allocate status to the co-members of
their choosing, they allocate it to those who have demonstrated
their willingness and ability to benefit the group (Flynn, 2003;
Hardy and Van Vugt, 2006; Anderson and Kilduff, 2009; Willer,
2009). This process of status acquisition via engagement in group-
beneficial tasks has been termed “competitive altruism” (Roberts,
1998; Barclay, 2004; Hardy and Van Vugt, 2006; McAndrew and
Perilloux, 2012): because group members obtain an individual
advantage by achieving high status, and because status can be
acquired via pro-group altruism, members compete with each
other to be the most group-beneficial.
Representative governments (e.g., forms of democracy) are also
characterized by processes whereby followers can choose their
own leaders, and award prestige to leaders who benefit them
(e.g., by voting them into office). Political philosophers have
long noted that these processes are key reasons why representa-
tive governments tend to be more effective in delivering benefits
to citizens, compared to less reciprocal arrangements such as
monarchy (Locke, 1689; Mill, 1861). In most businesses, how-
ever, such democratic processes are absent, and leaders are simply
imposed on followers. Thus a central dynamic of leader–follower
reciprocity – the process whereby followers choose their leaders,
and allocate prestige to them based on their ability to provide
group benefits – cannot occur in most businesses, which probably
results in followers becoming alienated and losing motivation to
cooperate voluntarily with leaders (Price and Van Vugt, in press).
Some successful businesses, however, are exceptions to this rule.
Leaders at W. L. Gore and associates, for example, are selected
via a process in which employees choose who they want to fol-
low, rather than one in which bosses are imposed on employees.
The philosophy behind this practice – “if you attract followers,
then you’re a leader” – recalls the bottom-up process of leader
selection that prevails among nomadic hunter-gatherers. W. L.
Gore’s very low employee turnover rate suggests that they are
implementing this practice to good effect (Van Vugt and Ahuja,
2010).
PREDICTION 2: PREFERENCES FOR LEADERS WILL BE BIASED IN FAVOR
OF PHYSICALLY FORMIDABLE AND INTELLIGENT MALES, AND MAY BE
MISMATCHED WITH MODERN ENVIRONMENTS
Because of processes in sexual selection (Darwin, 1871; Trivers,
1972), men are on average more physically formidable (e.g., taller
and stronger) than females. In the ancestral-type environments
of small-scale societies, some of the most important domains in
which leadership is required are male-dominated activities requir-
ing high physical formidability, such as hunting and war. The
leaders who are chosen in such domains are almost always males
(Service, 1966; Johnson and Earle, 1987). As a result, our minds
may have evolved to be biased toward assuming that all else equal,
physically formidable males make the most appropriate leaders
(Van Vugt and Ahuja, 2010). (Indeed more generally, people seem
to cognitively encode the concept of political power as a human
body, with higher power represented by a more formidable body;
Holbrook and Fessler, 2013).
Followers do appear to exhibit such biases in industrialized
societies: experimental and field studies of general leadership pref-
erences suggest that people tend to prefer leaders who are male
(Carlson et al., 2006; Elsesser and Lever, 2011), who are per-
ceived as taller based on their stature or facial height (Judge and
Cable, 2004; Gawley et al., 2009; Blaker et al., 2013; Re et al., 2013),
and who are perceived as healthier based on their bodily motion
(Kramer et al., 2010). Facial appearance may also provide cues
to pubertal testosterone levels and thus to physical formidability.
For example, male military academy graduates who were rated as
appearing more dominant in their student portraits went on to
achieve higher status in their careers (Mazur and Mueller, 1996).
Another formidability-related cue is physical attractiveness; traits
that are perceived as attractive are believed to be thosewhichwould
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have indicated health and biological quality in the ancestral past
(Grammer et al., 2003). Accordingly, followers express preferences
for physically attractive leaders (Anderson et al., 2001; Van Vugt
and Ahuja, 2010).
Preferences for physically formidable male leaders may, how-
ever, be mismatched with leadership requirements in modern
organizations (Van Vugt et al., 2008b). Our ancestors’ need for
expertise in male-dominated, physically aggressive coalitional
activities such as hunting and war is much-reduced in modern
businesses, but biases in favor of physically formidable males per-
sist. As a result of such biases, people in industrialized societies
may, for reasons that have become largely obsolete, tend to over-
look females and physically unimpressive males as candidates for
leadership positions, even if these candidates are in fact well-suited
for leadership inmodern contexts (VanVugt et al., 2008b; Price and
Van Vugt, in press). On the other hand, even if there is less of a
genuine need for physically formidable leaders in modern orga-
nizations than there was in the ancestral past, such leaders may
nevertheless perform especially effectively in some kinds of lead-
ership roles, due to how they are perceived by others. For example,
a leader’s high formidability could increase his bargaining power
in social interactions by making him seem more intimidating to
others (Sell et al., 2009; Lukaszewski, 2013); as a result that leader
might be relatively effective in tasks like deterring uncooperative
behaviors among followers andwinningnegotiationswith external
groups.
Other leader traits that tend to be widely preferred are intelli-
gence and communication skills (Den Hartog et al., 1999; Judge
et al., 2004). These preferences also seem consistent with the
requirements of leadership roles in the ancestral past (Tooby et al.,
2006; Van Vugt et al., 2008a). For instance, intelligence is neces-
sary formaking decisions thatwill affect groupwelfare in a positive
way (e.g., developing a strategy for successful group cooperative
action), and communication skills are essential for implementing
these decisions (e.g., persuading followers about the wisdom of
that strategy, and ensuring that the group acts out that strategy
in a precise and coordinated way). Unlike traits related to physi-
cal formidability, however, intelligence and communication skills
are probably just as genuinely relevant to leadership roles in mod-
ern environments as they were in the ancestral past. Competent
leadership in an industrialized society generally has little to do
with killing large game or physically dominating rivals, but con-
tinues to have much to do with devising and communicating a
successful strategy for collective action (Price and Van Vugt, in
press).
PREDICTION 3: PREFERENCES FOR LEADERS WILL BE DIFFERENT IN
DIFFERENT DOMAINS, AND MAY BE MISMATCHED WITH MODERN
ENVIRONMENTS
Leadership ability can be domain specific, and just as small-scale
societies distinguish among several kinds of leaders (as noted
above),members of industrialized societies prefer different leaders
for different roles (Price and Van Vugt, in press). This may be a
major reason why leadership is often shared in successful organi-
zations (Wassenaar and Pearce, 2011). For example, experimental
participants prefer leaders with a more masculine facial appear-
ance (like John McCain) in the context of war and intergroup
competition, and prefer leaders with a more feminine face (like
BarackObama) inpeaceful contexts (Little et al., 2006; Spisak et al.,
2012a,b). Domain-specific leadership preferences may even be
strong enough to override the general bias in favor of male leaders,
noted above: experimental evidence suggests that although male
leaders are preferred in times of intergroup competition, female
leaders are preferred when there is a need for conflict resolution
within the group (Van Vugt and Spisak, 2008).
On the other hand, our bias toward domain-specific leader-
ship may sometimes lead us astray, and can be another example
of mismatch (Van Vugt and Ronay, 2014; Price and Van Vugt, in
press). Hunter-gatherer collective actions tend to be small and
therefore relatively simple to organize and manage, so domain-
specific expertise (as opposed to management skills) may often
be the most important requirement for competent leadership.
It might make sense, for example, to choose the leader of a
three-member hunting expedition based on hunting expertise.
In a complex modern organization, however, the gulf between
domain-specific expertise and leadership can be more vast, and
managerial roles can require skills that have very little to do
with this expertise itself. In many professional sports, for exam-
ple, great former players are often preferred as managers, despite
an absence of evidence that better players make better managers
(Van Vugt and Ahuja, 2010). We should question our bias toward
assuming that superior ability in a specific activity will make one
particularly well-suited to lead an organization related to that
activity.
PREDICTION 4: FOLLOWERS WILL PREFER COMPETENT, PROSOCIAL,
AND “FAIR” LEADERS, BUT SOME PREFERENCES MAY BE
MISMATCHED WITH MODERN ENVIRONMENTS
According to service-for-prestige, followers are adapted to favor
leaders who are willing and able to provide them with benefits
(Price and Van Vugt, in press). Accordingly, research suggests
that people from a wide variety of cultures do prefer leaders
who score highly on both prosociality and competence (Van
Vugt et al., 2008a). The 61-culture GLOBE survey of univer-
sally valued leader traits (Den Hartog et al., 1999) indicates that
prosocial disposition (e.g., trustworthiness, fairness) and posses-
sion of group-beneficial skills (e.g., intelligence, competence) are
consistently valued attributes of leaders cross-culturally. These
findings complement a review by Hogan and Kaiser (2005), which
identified traits indicating prosociality (e.g., modesty, humil-
ity, and integrity) and group-beneficial skills (e.g., decisiveness,
competence, and vision) as the most important characteris-
tics of successful leaders. With regard to these prosocial traits,
note that Hogan and Kaiser (2005) define integrity as “keep-
ing one’s word, fulfilling one’s promises, not playing favorites,
and not taking advantage of one’s situation” (p. 173). Integrity
is thus essentially synonymous with trustworthiness, which is
an essential trait in a reliable reciprocal partner (Price, 2006a;
Rilling and Sanfey, 2011). The emphasis on modesty and humil-
ity suggests that followers prefer leaders who are not overly
self-centered, which would allow them to focus more on the
interests of followers (Price and Van Vugt, in press). Indeed,
other results from the GLOBE survey indicate universal dis-
taste for traits associated with leadership that is self-serving and
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unconcerned with the interests of followers (e.g., dominance,
selfishness).
This aversion to overly self-centered leadership is the flip
side of the preference for prosocial leaders: leaders are reviled
if they control groups in a manner that benefits themselves
while harming followers (Tooby et al., 2006). A recent event that
epitomizes this principle is the extent to which New Jersey Gov-
ernor Chris Christie has been excoriated for his perceived role
in the “Bridgegate” scandal. Christie’s political allies allegedly
orchestrated the partial closure of the Fort Lee bridge from
New Jersey to New York – the busiest motor-vehicle bridge
in the world – in order to punish Fort Lee’s mayor for not
endorsing Christie’s candidacy (Kleinfeld et al., 2014). The lane
closures caused traffic chaos and imposed large costs on Christie’s
own electorate, all for the intended purpose of generating a
narrowly selfish and relatively trivial benefit for Christie. It is
also worth considering, in this context, that the extreme lev-
els of income inequality that can obtain in modern businesses
may be perceived by followers as exploitative failures of reci-
procity. CEOs in the United States between 2000 and 2013,
for example, made 200–400 times as much as the average
worker (Mishel and Sabadish, 2013), a level of inequality that
far exceeds those observed in hunter-gatherer societies (Smith
et al., 2010). Leaders who accept salaries that are massively
higher than those of followers may be seen as hoarding group
resources for their own selfish ends (Price and Van Vugt, in press;
Van Vugt et al., 2008a).
Finally, note that although people universally prefer “fair” lead-
ers (Den Hartog et al., 1999), this universality probably masks
some important underlying variance. Because different types of
followers prefer different kinds of fairness, it will often be difficult
for a leader to achieve reciprocitywith all followers simultaneously.
Whereas some followers may perceive social equality as maxi-
mally fair, others may see some forms of inequality as maximally
fair, for example, inequality that results from socially sanctioned
competition (such as better-qualified job candidates compet-
ing successfully for higher-paying jobs). Increased approval of
inequality and competition is expressed by individuals who are
better-positioned to win competitions for status and resources,
such as the highly educated, the wealthy, and members of ethnic
majorities (Ritzman and Tomaskovic-Devey, 1992; Pratto et al.,
2006; Kunovich and Slomczynski, 2007).
Other traits associated with approval of inequality and com-
petition may be more comprehensible in terms of ancestral
environments than modern ones. For example, men who are rela-
tively muscular are more likely to approve of social and economic
inequality (Price et al., 2011), particularly if they are relatively
wealthy (Petersen et al., 2013; however, this research also found
that relativelymuscularmen are less approving of inequality if they
are relatively poor). Muscular men are also more likely to endorse
aggressive methods of conflict resolution, including war (Sell et al.,
2009; Price et al., 2012). These preferences may have been adaptive
ancestrally, when muscularity was relatively key to success in social
competitions, but seem less rational in modern contexts in which
such success has more to do with education and technology. Thus,
the kind of “fair” leaders that followers prefer may sometimes be
mismatched with aspects of modern environments.
PREDICTION 5: FOLLOWERS WILL PREFER LEADERS WHO DELIVER
INGROUP ADVANTAGE
Ancestrally, one of the most vital benefits leaders could provide
was expertise in matters of intergroup competition, and in mod-
ern environments, followers prefer leaders who are perceived as
ingroup members and strong representatives of ingroup interests
(Hogg, 2001). At times when the ingroup is threatened by an exter-
nal enemy,memberswillmost exhibit this pro-ingroup bias and be
most supportive of their leader (the “rally effect”; Van Vugt et al.,
2008a). The rally effect benefits followers, who gain security via
their increased willingness to cooperate with the leader’s efforts
to organize them against the enemy, and it also benefits leaders,
who gain status due to their increased ability to benefit the group
(VanVugt and De Cremer, 1999). Because the rally effect enhances
the leader’s status, there is the potential for abuse; leaders could
exaggerate or provoke an external threat in order to consolidate
their own power (Price and Van Vugt, in press).
On the other hand, leaders can also use the rally effect in a less
self-serving and more group-beneficial way. If followers are per-
suaded by a leader of a great need to beat a competitor, they may
cooperate particularly effectively: experimental evidence suggests
that groups are more cooperative and productive when they per-
ceive a competitive threat from an external group (Van Vugt et al.,
2007; McDonald et al., 2012). Note, however, that this tendency
appears to be stronger in males than females, which suggests that
it evolved in conditions of male coalitional violence (Van Vugt
et al., 2007). This suggestion is also made by evidence that peo-
ple who are experiencing or have experienced life during wartime
tend to play economic games in a more cooperative and egalitarian
manner (Gneezy and Fessler, 2012; Bauer et al., 2014).
PREDICTION 6: DOMINANT LEADERSHIP EMERGES WHEN FOLLOWERS
LACK EXIT OPTIONS
Service-for-prestige predicts that leaders benefit by adopting a
more dominant and coercive leadership style when they can get
away with it, because this saves them the costs of delivering ben-
efits to followers. Leaders should be able to get away with this
more in modern contexts in which their bargaining power relative
to followers is increased for whatever reason, for example, due to
it becoming institutionally normalized (Henrich and Gil-White,
2001) in a way that increases follower dependence (Emerson,
1962). One of the most important ways in which leaders’ rel-
ative power will be increased in modern societies, however, is
if followers have reduced power to exit groups. It was noted
above that leadership in small-scale societies seems to become
more dominant and less reciprocal when followers have bet-
ter exit options, and it has long been suggested that a similar
pattern exists in industrialized societies, with leadership becom-
ing more autocratic when members have fewer exit options (cf.
Hirschman, 1970).
In consideration of the above, service-for-prestige expects
that leaders of modern organizations will more likely adopt a
dominance-based leadership style when employees are less able
or willing to leave their jobs, or to otherwise reject or retaliate
against non-beneficial leaders (Price and Van Vugt, in press). In
such situations, it will be less necessary for leaders to pay the
costs of providing benefits to followers in order to compel them
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to remain in the organization. This may explain why employees
with better exit options tend to receive a greater share of organi-
zational rewards (Rusbult et al., 1988). If leaders adopt a coercive
leadership style when their followers do possess good exit options,
theywill likely lose followers: in experimental research byVanVugt
et al. (2004), members defected more from groups if they were led
by autocratic-style instead of democratic-style leaders.
When followers lack exit options, and thus have reduced
bargaining power to demand reciprocitywith leaders, amore com-
fortable niche is created for leaders who are concerned only with
maximizing their own power and who have no genuine regard
for follower interests (Price and Van Vugt, in press). Such toxic
leadership may be exhibited by those with high scores on at least
one of the “dark triad” traits of Machiavellianism, narcissism, and
psychopathy (Paulhus and Williams, 2002; Van Vugt and Ahuja,
2010). Such traits appear to be more prevalent among corporate
leaders than among the general population (Babiak et al., 2010),
and employees who serve under leaders high in such traits report
reduced well-being and job satisfaction (Mathieu et al., 2014).
PREDICTIONS 7 AND 8: DISRESPECTFUL FOLLOWERS OF BENEFICIAL
LEADERS WILL ATTRACT SOCIAL PENALTIES (PUNISHMENT AND/OR
SOCIAL EXCLUSION) FROM OTHER FOLLOWERS, WHEREAS
DISRESPECTFUL FOLLOWERS OF NON-BENEFICIAL LEADERS WILL
ATTRACT SOCIAL REWARDS (ENHANCED REPUTATION AND PRESTIGE)
FROM OTHER FOLLOWERS
We conclude this section by looking at some of the novel pre-
dictions that service-for-prestige is able to make because it regards
leader–follower reciprocity as a collective actionproblem.As noted
above, service-for-prestige predicts that leaders provide public
goods to followers in exchange for prestige, which followers must
collectively supply. As in any collective action, this presents a
free rider problem: a follower who took leader-provided bene-
fits without paying the costs of respect (by going out of one’s
way to promote the welfare and interests of the leader, includ-
ing by deferring to and cooperating with the leader) would be
advantaged over respectful followers. In order to solve this prob-
lem, this advantage would have to be neutralized or reversed.
As in other collective actions, this neutralization/reversal would
be expected to occur via the imposition of social penalties on
the free rider, in the form of punishment (e.g., physically harm-
ing or appropriating resources from the disrespectful follower)
and/or social exclusion (i.e., preventing the disrespectful fol-
lower from participating in advantageous social and cooperative
interactions; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Price and Johnson, 2011).
Thus, a general prediction of service-for-prestige is that disre-
spectful followers of beneficial (i.e., public-good-provisioning)
leaders will tend to attract social penalties from other members
of their group. Note that because such a penalty would repre-
sent a cost imposed on not only a free rider in a collective action
but also a cheater in a reciprocal exchange (with the leader), it
could take the form of negative indirect reciprocity (Alexander,
1979; Nowak and Sigmund, 2005), whereby one follower imposes
costs on another for failing to engage in reciprocity with the
leader.
In considering the various ways by which social penalties could
be imposed on disrespectful followers, it is important to keep in
mind that to the extent that a penalty is costly to impose, it could
lead to a second-order free rider problem (Yamagishi, 1986; Boyd
and Richerson, 1992). Second-order free riders in this situation
would be followers who paid the costs of respect, but who did not
penalize disrespectful followers; theywould obtain the benefit pro-
duced by these penalties (i.e., the leader’s continued motivation to
produce public goods), but by avoiding the costs of administering
these penalties, they would acquire higher net benefits than fol-
lowers who paid to allocate both prestige and penalties. There are
a variety of ways in which evolution could overcome the recur-
sive nature of free rider problems and there is no consensus about
how it does so (Price, 2003). However, researchers do agree that
evolution overcomes these problems somehow (Boyd et al., 2003;
Barclay, 2006; Bowles and Gintis, 2011).
Researchers also agree that the penalties used to solve these
problems can take the form of direct punishment, and that
cooperators in collective actions tend to experience punitive
sentiment toward free riders (Price et al., 2002; Mathew and
Boyd, 2014). Punitive sentiment leads those who experience it
to support and advocate the punishment of free riders, and
may lead them to administer this punishment themselves (Fehr
and Gächter, 2002; Price, 2005). It is therefore plausible that
respectful followers experience punitive sentiment toward disre-
spectful followers, and act on this sentiment either by punishing
these followers themselves, or else by advocating and support-
ing the punishment of these followers by other group members.
This punishment could be administered by one specific member
(O’Gorman et al., 2009), including the leader him/herself. Even
in situations in which leaders impose such penalties themselves,
we would expect for followers to experience punitive sentiment,
as it would lead them to lend political support to the leader’s
punitive actions. Punishment could also be administered in a
coordinatedmanner bymore than onemember; coordinated pun-
ishment could reduce the per capita costs of punishment and thus
mitigate the second-order free rider problem (Boyd et al., 2010;
Guala, 2012).
The social penalties of free riding do not have to involve direct
or explicit punishment, and in both small-scale and industrial-
ized societies they may take the form of informal social sanctions
that lead to reputational damage (Fried, 1967; Falk et al., 2005).
Among hunter-horticultural Shuar, for example, villagers who are
perceived as being less respectful of a popular leader are themselves
respected less (Price, 2003). The main costs of such reputational
damage may involve exclusion from advantageous social inter-
actions (Barclay and Willer, 2007; Sylwester and Roberts, 2010;
Baumard et al., 2013). In modern organizations, employees who
act disrespectfully toward popular leaders may be sanctioned by
other employees via social exclusion processes that are facilitated
by gossip (Barkow, 1992; Williams, 2007).
Note that the prediction of social penalties (punishment and/or
social exclusion) for disrespectful followers only applies to situa-
tions in which leaders are providing followers with public goods,
because this is the only context in which followers will need to
engage in reciprocity with leaders by collectively providing them
with prestige. If followers do not perceive that a leader is provid-
ing them with benefits, they should not be motivated to generate
prestige for that leader, nor to impose costs on other followers who
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fail to generate prestige. On the contrary, if the leader is unpop-
ular, followers should tend to regard disrespectful followers in a
positive light. Leaders will be unpopular if they are seen as failing
to provide public goods for one reason or another, for example,
because they are incompetent or exploiting followers for their own
narrowly selfish ends (Tooby et al., 2006), and followers face the
problem of how to collectively strip such leaders of status. A dis-
respectful follower of an unpopular leader risks retaliation from
the leader, and so will be seen by co-members as a selfless and
prestige-worthy contributor to the public good: if you brave the
wrath of Darth Vader, you will become a hero to the rebellion.
Thus according to service-for-prestige, rescinding status from a
non-beneficial or exploitative leader, just like supplying it to a ben-
eficial one, is a collective action problem (Price and Van Vugt, in
press). Accordingly, service-for-prestige predicts that disrespectful
followers of such leaders will attract social rewards from other fol-
lowers. These rewards will come in the form of enhanced prestige,
which like all forms of prestige (as discussed above) should afford
increased access to material, reproductive, and/or social resources.
DISTINGUISHING SERVICE-FOR-PRESTIGE FROM OTHER
LEADERSHIP THEORIES
NOVEL PREDICTIONS OF SERVICE-FOR-PRESTIGE
A Lakatosian view (Lakatos, 1978) suggests that a progressive sci-
entific theory will make not only correct predictions shared by
other theories, but also novel correct predictions. Some predic-
tions of service-for-prestige presented above may be shared with
many leadership theories (e.g., that followers will prefer lead-
ers who are intelligent, competent, and able to deliver ingroup
advantage). We included these predictions not to suggest that they
are unique to service-for-prestige, but in order to demonstrate
that service-for-prestige is consistent with a broad range of well-
supported observations about leader–follower relations. These are
observations that any useful theory of leader–follower relations
should explain, even if other theories can explain them as well. In
order to judge the added value of service-for-prestige, however, we
must focus on whether it makes any novel predictions.
Because of its evolutionary foundations, service-for-prestige
makes some predictions that are not shared by most non-
evolutionary theories. These include predictions related to mis-
match theory, such as that followers will judge leaders based on
characteristics that are more relevant to small-scale societies than
to modern organizations (e.g., physical formidability). However,
most of these mismatch-related predictions are also made by the
evolutionary leadership theory presented by Van Vugt and Ahuja
(2010). What truly distinguishes service-for-prestige is not its
evolutionary foundations per se, but rather its assumption that
leader–follower relations evolved via a reciprocal interaction that
entailed collective action problems for followers. Thus, the most
important novel predictionsmade by service-for-prestige are those
which emanate directly from this assumption, specifically, predic-
tions seven and eight above: disrespectful followers of beneficial
leaders will attract social penalties from other followers, whereas
disrespectful followers of non-beneficial leaders will attract social
rewards from other followers. As far as we are aware, no other
theory of leader–follower relations makes not only predictions 1
through 6 above, but also predictions 7 and 8.
COMPARING SERVICE-FOR-PRESTIGE TO OTHER EVOLUTIONARY
THEORIES FOR WHY IT PAYS TO LEAD
Predictions 7 and 8 distinguish service-for-prestige not just from
the evolutionary leadership theory mentioned above (Van Vugt
and Ahuja, 2010), but also from two other notable evolutionary
theories of leadership. Both of these theories address the issue of
why, given the costs that leaders must incur in order to generate
public goods for followers, it would be adaptive for leaders to lead.
The first of these theories is costly signaling theory, which pro-
poses that acts of providing public goods to one’s group can serve
as a valuable opportunity to advertise one’s desirable qualities
to potential allies, cooperative partners, and mates (Gintis et al.,
2001; Hawkes and Bliege Bird, 2002). For example, the opportu-
nity to lead a hunt might afford one an opportunity to show off
attractive traits such as hunting skill, health, and formidability.
This advertising could lead to fitness-enhancing social and mat-
ing opportunities that would compensate the leader for leadership
costs. Although costly signaling offers a plausible explanation for
some aspects of leadership, it is distinguishable from service-for-
prestige because it does not predict that followers face the collective
actionproblemof generating prestige. Instead, it presumes that the
increased social affiliation that a follower offers a leader represents
a private good for both leader and follower. This focus on private
goods is why costly signaling theory does not make predictions 7
or 8 above (Price, 2003).
The second evolutionary theory of leader compensation could
be called the “asymmetric interest” model. From this perspec-
tive, leaders of collective actions are compensated by virtue of
the fact that they have a greater interest in the success of the
collective action than do most followers. Their interest may be
greater, for example, because compared to followers they stand to
acquire a larger share of the resource produced, or because this
resource is inherently more valuable to them (Tooby and Cos-
mides, 1988; Ruttan and Borgerhoff Mulder, 1999; Hooper et al.,
2010). Before examining how this theory is distinguishable from
service-for-prestige, it is important to note that some versions of
it could in fact be identical to service-for-prestige in everything
but name. This would be the case if the leader’s increased inter-
est in the collective action were the result of collectively allocated
prestige from followers, for example, if this prestige led follow-
ers to jointly and voluntarily grant the leader a relatively large
share of the spoils. If the leader’s increased interest in the collec-
tive action were not the result of such prestige, however, then this
theory would make different predictions than service-for-prestige.
Because it would predict that the leader was leading the collective
action out of a private interest in collective success, it would not
predict that the leader would require any additional compensa-
tion from followers (e.g., prestige), nor that followers would face
a collective action problem in generating this prestige. Therefore
this theory would not even make the prediction that leaders will
acquire more prestige than followers, let alone predictions 7 and 8
above.
COMPARING SERVICE-FOR-PRESTIGE TO EXISTING
NON-EVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP THEORIES
Service-for-prestige has some important aspects in common with
previous exchange theories of leadership that are not explicitly
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grounded in evolutionary theory (Price and Van Vugt, in press).
One of these is leader–member exchange theory (LMX; Graen and
Uhl-Bien, 1995), which suggests that leadership quality depends
heavily on the quality of social relationships between a leader and
individual followers. Transactional theories of leadership are also
exchange theories; the exchange process that is usually empha-
sized in these theories is one in which leaders use punishments
and rewards to motivate followers to achieve group goals (Bass,
1991). Interestingly, however, Hollander (1992) suggests that this
transaction may take the form of leaders providing benefits to
followers in exchange for esteem. Also relevant is servant leader-
ship theory (Greenleaf, 2002; Gillet et al., 2011), which emphasizes
that the influence of good leaders stems from their compassion,
altruism, moral authority, and ability to benefit followers.
Despite some clear points of similarity with these theories,
service-for-prestige possesses several unique attributes (Price and
Van Vugt, in press). Unlike servant leadership, service-for-prestige
sees the “altruism” of good leaders as something that not only
benefits followers, but also ultimately profits leaders (because
leaders exchange this altruism for prestige). Unlike LMX, service-
for-prestige focuses on relationship quality not in general but
specifically in terms on how evolution designed both leaders and
followers to achieve an efficient exchange of fitness-relevant ben-
efits. Further, service-for-prestige examines relationships between
leaders and groups of followers, whereas LMX focuses on dyadic
leader–follower relationships. Only service-for-prestige, therefore,
predicts that followers face a collective action problem in gen-
erating leader prestige. And unlike either servant leadership or
LMX, service-for-prestige attempts to explain not only how lead-
ership can most benefit followers, but also how it can most harm
them.
Finally, service-for-prestige can potentially explain not only
the transactional, material rewards and punishments provided
by leaders to followers, but also the “symbolic” benefits of lead-
ership such as enhanced cohesion and identity; such relatively
abstract benefits may plausibly have contributed to the fitness of
individual groupmembers in the past, if they improved the group’s
solidarity and hence ability to compete for resources with other
groups. In otherwords, symbolic benefitsmay represent proximate
mechanisms that over evolutionary time have enabled leaders and
followers to achieve more ultimate (fitness-related) goals. In this
respect, service-for-prestige has as much in common with trans-
formational leadership models of leadership (Bass, 1991, 1998) as
with transactional or social identity models of leadership (Price
and Van Vugt, in press).
SERVICE-FOR-PRESTIGE AND SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE
Service-for-prestige proposes that voluntary leader–follower rela-
tions involvemany of the samebehaviors that are involved in coop-
erative interactions more generally, such as reciprocal exchange,
collective action, and punishment of non-cooperators. A growing
body of social neuroscience research focuses on these behaviors,
especially exchange and punishment (Rilling and Sanfey, 2011).
Most of this research has examined cooperation in dyadic con-
texts and relatively little has focused on group behaviors, which to
some extent limits the direct applicability of this research to the
group contexts of leadership. However, the science is developing
rapidly, and interest is now turning to the neuroscience of group
cooperation as well (Zak and Barraza, 2013).
As social neuroscience is uniquely poised to reveal the spe-
cific neural systems that are involved in cooperative behaviors, it
may ultimately provide the best methods for testing some of the
most fundamental claims of service-for-prestige. One such claim
is that voluntary leader–follower exchange evolved as an elabo-
rated form of dyadic cooperation, which allowed for reciprocity
to occur between an individual and multiple group members. If
correct, then the same core neural systems involved in dyadic
cooperation are likely also involved in voluntary leader–follower
exchange. If social neuroscience could shed light on the validity of
this assumption, it would contribute to the resolution of a debate
among evolutionary researchers, some of whom claim that coop-
eration between an individual and multiple group members is
likely to involve direct reciprocity (Price, 2003, 2006a; Tooby et al.,
2006) and someof whomclaim such cooperation could evolve only
via completely different processes such as cultural group selection
(Boyd and Richerson, 1988; Henrich, 2004; Bowles and Gintis,
2011).
If service-for-prestige is correct to expect that neural systems
that evolved to enable dyadic reciprocity are also fundamental to
leader–follower exchange, then there already exists a fairly large
body of social neuroscience research that is relevant to service-
for-prestige. There has been quite a bit of neuroscience-related
research on behavior in the ultimatum game, for example, and
this game can be interpreted as a simple form of leader–follower
exchange. The ultimatum game is a two-player economics experi-
ment involving a proposer and a responder. The proposer is given
a sum of funds and decides how much to offer to the responder.
If the responder accepts the offer, then the deal goes through. For
example, if the proposer offers 40% of $10 to the responder and
the responder accepts, then the proposer keeps $6 and the respon-
der takes home $4. If the responder rejects the offer, however, then
both players get nothing. The “rational” decision for responders
is to accept any offer greater than 0, even if it is very low, because
if they reject they will always get 0. By the same token, the ratio-
nal decision for proposers would be to offer the lowest possible
amount above 0. However, research shows that responders tend
to reject offers that are too far below 50%, and that proposers’
offers tend to be close to 50% (Bowles and Gintis, 2011). The pro-
poser can be seen as the leader, and the proposer characteristics
that cause cooperation to fail in the game – that is, selfishness
and unfairness – are those that followers associate, as noted above,
with dominant and “bad” leadership (Den Hartog et al., 1999).
A rejected offer in the ultimatum game, therefore, is essentially
similar to a case of failed leadership.
Most studies on the neural and hormonal correlates of behavior
in the ultimatum game are concerned with responder behavior,
but a few focus on proposers. For instance, one study shows
that patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex (VMPFC), a condition associated with impaired concern for
other people, made more selfish proposals. Compared with a con-
trol group these patients offered significantly less and seemed
less motivated by the emotion of guilt (Krajbich et al., 2009).
These results suggest that such individuals would be less likely to
emerge as successful leaders in the context of service-for-prestige
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exchanges. Other research found that men who received a small
dose of testosterone, a hormone associated with aggression and
status competition, made more unfair offers compared to men
who received a placebo (Zak et al., 2009; cf. Burnham, 2007,
who found no significant relationship between circulating testos-
terone levels and ultimatum game offers in men). Considering
that unfair offers are more likely to be rejected, this result suggests
that some neurological effects of testosterone in men may reduce
effectiveness as a service-for-prestige leader (however, other effects
of testosterone, such as those increasing physical formidability,
may increase perceived suitability for leadership). A recent study
among a sample of managers shows that baseline testosterone
levels correlate positively with a more dominant leadership style,
and negatively with a laissez-faire leadership style (Van der Meij
et al., unpublished data).
Other studies have been conducted to examine the neural cor-
relates of responder behaviors in the ultimatum game, which can
be conceived of as ameasure of followership. Data on patients with
brain damage, especially in the VMPFC, show that they are more
likely than healthy participants to reject offers that are deemed
unfair (Koenigs and Tranel, 2007). This brain area is thought to be
important for emotion regulation. Other studies have suggested
that people with higher levels of serotonin – which has been linked
to aggression, hostility and impulsivity – are less likely to accept
unfair offers from proposers (Crockett et al., 2008; Emanuele et al.,
2008). Higher levels of circulating testosterone have also been
linked to increased rejection of unfair offers (Burnham, 2007).
Taken together, these studies on VMPFC damage, serotonin and
testosterone support the view that rejection of unfairness is related
to impulsivity and negative emotion, and that individuals who are
less able to regulate negative emotion will be less likely to emerge
as followers in unequal leader–follower relationships. On the other
hand, better ability to regulate negative emotion might make one
more likely to accept unequal (e.g., highly dominant) leadership.
An fMRI study by Kirk et al. (2011) compared ultimatum game
behavior in people who regularly perform Buddhist meditation
(entailing training in the regulation of negative emotion) and a
control group. Meditators accepted unfair offers more often than
controls, and displayed reduced activity in the anterior insula, an
area associated with the emotion of disgust.
Studies have also begun to indicate the general brain regions
involved with the punishment of non-cooperators in dyadic trust
game contexts (de Quervain et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2006). With
increased methodological precision, and as studies broaden their
focus to include punishment of free riders in collective actions,
we will become increasingly able to answer punishment-related
questions raised by service-for-prestige, such as: when a follower
who respects a leader perceives another follower to bedisrespecting
that leader, does he or she experience punitive sentiment that
is similar (in terms of the neural systems involved) to the anti-
free-rider punitive sentiment experienced by high-contributing
members of other kinds of collective actions (Fehr and Gächter,
2002; Price et al., 2002)? Such results will shed additional light
on debates between evolutionary researchers, mentioned above,
about the extent to which leader–follower relations were designed
by the same evolutionary processes that enable reciprocity and
collective action in other cooperative contexts, as opposed to being
designed by qualitatively different processes such as cultural group
selection.
CONCLUSION
Service-for-prestige does not claim that either kind of leader–
follower relationship described above – prestige-based reciprocity
or dominance-based coercion – is more “natural” than the other;
people are adapted for both kinds of interaction. However, reci-
procity clearly involves the greater degree of mutual benefit. Unlike
coercion, reciprocity allows followers to act on their leader pref-
erences, and collectively award prestige to people who, via their
ability to benefit followers, they deem worthy of leadership roles.
Reciprocity is also more closely associated with what most would
consider “good” leadership (Den Hartog et al., 1999), that is, lead-
ership that most helps followers to achieve their shared goals, as
opposed to primarily serving the narrow interests of the leader
(Price and Van Vugt, in press).
There is also much that service-for-prestige does not explain
about the evolution of leadership. Most importantly, as noted
above, it does not explain why leadership has evolved in so many
non-human species, nor why it first appeared in the human
lineage. Leadership has evolved in many species to solve prob-
lems related to information-sharing and coordination problems
(King et al., 2009), and these were probably its initial func-
tions among human ancestors as well (Van Vugt and Kurzban,
2007; Van Vugt et al., 2008a). However, we suggest that humans,
much more than any other species, have been able to use reci-
procity to enhance the benefits of leadership, by providing leaders
with prestige in exchange for services that would otherwise have
been too costly for leaders to provide. Our theory applies to
humans much more than any other species, because humans
are uniquely well-adapted for sophisticated cooperative behaviors
such as collective action and various forms of reciprocity (Tooby
and Cosmides, 1996; Hammerstein, 2002; Tooby et al., 2006;
Bowles and Gintis, 2011).
By considering the kinds of problems that evolution had to
solve in order to enable leaders and followers to interact adaptively
in human ancestral environments, service-for-prestige is able to
make novel predictions about leader and follower behaviors in
modern environments. Service-for-prestige also promotes a syn-
thesis of the theoretical frameworks of positive reciprocity and
collective action. Although each of these frameworks has had an
enormous independent influence in behavioral science, they are
thought of by many evolutionary researchers as distinct and non-
overlapping (Boyd and Richerson, 1988; Henrich, 2004; Bowles
and Gintis, 2011). We suggest, as others have previously (Price,
2003, 2006a; Tooby et al., 2006), that reciprocity and collective
action are not as distinct as these researchers suggest, and that
syntheses of these theories will enable more predictive evolution-
ary theories of complex human cooperation. Social neuroscience
is in a unique position to help resolve debates about the extent
to which these theories can in fact be integrated. If service-for-
prestige is correct, then many of the same neural systems involved
in cooperative behaviors such as reciprocity, collective action, and
free rider punishment should be similarly involved when these
processes occur in the specific context of leader–follower relations.
Neuroscientific methods are already proving useful in identifying
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 363 | 13
Price and Van Vugt The evolution of leader–follower reciprocity
and illuminating the nature of these systems, and as they become
increasingly precise, they will become increasingly essential for
answering fundamental questions about how humans are adapted
for leadership, followership, and indeed all forms of social behav-
ior. More frequent occasions for interaction between evolutionary
social psychologists and social neuroscientists, such as that pro-
vided by this special issue, will enable us to take full advantage of
these new research opportunities.
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